Download PDF by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives

By Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter Bamberg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann (eds.)

ISBN-10: 3540516751

ISBN-13: 9783540516750

ISBN-10: 3642750605

ISBN-13: 9783642750601

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1 r(0,m O,s2) m - 14 + aa 2 2(1 + 2aa 2 )2 While the share remains unchanged, the rent refers now to mO rather than to m. Is the set of contracts 1,2 working as a self-selection device? The answer is yes. To prove this answer one has to consider the choice between contracts 1,2 for each type of individuals. Firstly, contract 2 was constructed in such a way that type-O agents are indifferent between contracts 1,2. So increase the rent of contract 2 by one dollar or so to induce type-O agents definitely decide for contract 2.

It may thus happen that agency costs are so high or, equivalently, that the principal's welfare (22) is such low that she prefers no cooperation with an agent at all. The principal, perhaps, has other opportunities which determine a certain reservation level also for herself. Three ways to overcome such a situation of too high agency costs can be outlined. Firstly, one could enlarge the set P of feasible payment schemes. Consider nonlinear schemes of the form (8) or bonus-penalty schemes of the form (9).

The principal's prediction is always correct. Rather than that the true problem is: both individuals cannot freely negotiate in order to agree upon any pair (x,p) of effort and payment. Suppose, for a moment, both individuals would agree to realize a particular pair (x,p) where x f ~(p). Then the principal, unable to observe the agent, can predict that the agent will realize the effort x* = ~(p) in disaccord with the agreement. And the selfish agent will, in fact, make his decision x* as predicted.

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Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives by Günter Bamberg, Klaus Spremann (auth.), Prof. Dr. Günter Bamberg, Prof. Dr. Klaus Spremann (eds.)

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